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Abstract 
Recent research suggests that paranoia, like other psychiatric symptoms, may exist on a 
continuum with normal experiences. What pushes people from the normal to the severe end of 
the continuum has yet to be determined. Theoretical models of paranoia place importance on 
negative emotion, especially social anxieties, and cognitive reasoning biases. To fully understand 
the differences in paranoid ideation in non-clinical and schizophrenia populations, more 
information is needed regarding the causal mechanisms.   Experimental paradigms provide the 
mechanism to test potential pathways through which persecutory ideation can develop. The goal 
of this study is to reveal mechanisms that may contribute to increases in paranoid ideation by 
experimentally manipulating fear and by identifying other potential individual factors.    
A sample of 253 undergraduates was randomly assigned to a neutral or fearful 
experimental emotion induction. In both conditions, the presence of self-referential thoughts and 
persecutory ideation was assessed. Following the induction, participants completed ratings of 
self-referential and persecutory ideation and additional measures of social anxiety, general 
anxiety, depression and cognitive reasoning biases. These responses were compared to the level 
of self-referential and persecutory ideation in a sample of 46 individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia who completed self-report ratings of self-referential and persecutory ideation, 
general anxiety and depression but did not participate in the emotion induction. We found that 
the fear manipulation increased persecutory and self-referential thoughts in undergraduates. 
Further, social anxiety and cognitive reasoning biases were related to increases in persecutory 
ideation, such that the undergraduate group who were high in social anxiety or cognitive biases 
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at baseline had paranoia at equivalent level as the schizophrenia group following emotion 
induction. This study provides evidence that ideas of reference and persecutory thoughts are not 
confined to individuals diagnosed with psychotic disorders as they can be enhanced by fear in 
individuals high on social anxiety and cognitive biases.  Together, the results suggest that fearful 
states, cognitive biases and social anxiety are potential mechanisms for increases in paranoid 
thought. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Severe forms of unfounded suspicion and mistrust of people are referred to as paranoia 
and it is one of the most common symptoms of schizophrenia, occurring in roughly 50% of 
diagnosed individuals (Cutting, 1997).  Recent research suggests that paranoia, like other 
psychiatric symptoms, may exist on a continuum from suspiciousness and ideas of reference at 
the mild end to persecutory ideation at the severe end (e.g., Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, 
Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Freeman & Garety, 1999; Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, 
Smith, et al., 2005; Martin & Penn, 2001). Within the general population, suspiciousness and 
ideas of reference have occurred in 10-15% of the general population within the last month. 
Moreover, 30-40% of people believe that negative comments have been made behind their back 
in the past week (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith, et al., 2005). What causes people to 
move from the mild to the more severe end of the spectrum is unknown.  Therefore, the first 
purpose of this study is to determine whether a fearful emotion induction can move individuals 
from one end of the spectrum to the other.  The second purpose of this study is to determine 
whether there are individual differences (social anxiety, and cognitive biases) that are also 
associated with increases in these processes.   
Freeman and colleagues (2005) suggest that there are two dimensions that make up the 
continuum of paranoid thoughts: ideas of reference and persecutory ideation. Ideas of reference 
and persecutory ideation have a hierarchical relationship. In this model, suspicious thoughts and 
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ideas of reference (i.e., the feelings that neutral stimuli in one’s environment may refer to them), 
are common in the general population. However, persecutory thoughts (i.e., feeling that others 
are out to get you or cause you harm) are rarer and characteristic of clinically significant 
pathology. Thus, while 48% of people endorse that, on a weekly basis, strangers or friends look 
at them critically, only 8% of people endorse that on weekly basis that they have a suspicion, 
“that someone has it in for me (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith, et al., 2005).” Furthermore, 
the development of persecutory ideation is predicated on the experience of increases in the 
amount of suspicious and referential thoughts (Combs & Penn, 2004; Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith, et al., 2005; Green et al., 2008).  Taken together, while persecutory thoughts 
are rarer and indicative of clinical presentation of paranoid ideation, concerns regarding social 
evaluation or vulnerability are quite common in the general population.   
Freeman’s Threat-Anticipation Model suggests that the occurrence of paranoid thoughts 
depends upon affective processes (particularly anxiety), perceptual anomalies and cognitive 
reasoning biases. Such that, in the case of a stressful and anxiety-provoking life event, if and 
when an individual experiences a confusing anomalous internal state (provide brief example), 
persecutory ideation at a clinical or delusional level is more likely to occur (e.g., Freeman, 
Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002) in the presence of cognitive reasoning biases 
(e.g., jumping to conclusions--the tendency to gather small amounts of information when making 
judgments) (e.g., Freeman, Gittins, et al., 2008; Moritz & Woodward, 2005). 
Cognitive models, such as the Threat-Anticipation Model, suggest that biases in 
reasoning play an integral role in the development of paranoid thoughts. Cognitive reasoning 
biases increase the likelihood that someone will interpret ambiguous, or even neutral information 
in a paranoid manner (Freeman et al., 2005).  The ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias, or the tendency 
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to gather limited amounts of data to make a judgment, has been found consistently found in 
people with delusions and is thought to contribute to persecutory ideation formation (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999).  Furthermore, dichotomous, or “all-or-nothing” thinking and a failure to 
consider other alternative are also associated with persecutory ideation (Fowler, Garety, & 
Kunipers, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004).  Ambiguous situations can sometimes be difficult to 
interpret and individuals high in cognitive reasoning biases may be more likely to apply paranoid 
interpretations to ambiguous situations and perceive them as more threatening (e.g., Freeman et 
al., 2002) 
While Freeman’s (2002) model of paranoid thoughts is widely accepted, it is still unclear 
what exactly influences someone to shift from normal suspiciousness and ideas of reference to 
psychotic persecutory ideation. Reasoning biases (e.g., jumping to conclusions--the tendency to 
gather small amounts of information when making judgements) plus anomalous perception, are 
thought to influence the development of paranoid thoughts (e.g., Freeman, Gittins, et al., 2008; 
Moritz & Woodward, 2005) and distinguish individuals with psychosis from other populations 
(Peters et al., 2013). In addition to reasoning biases, anxiety and other forms of negative affect, 
like depression, cause increases in paranoid ideation and persecutory belief (Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith, et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2012). Furthermore, other work suggests that 
reasoning biases interact to increase the development of paranoid thoughts (Lincoln, Lange, 
Burau, Exner, & Moritz, 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that manipulating anxiety in 
individuals high in cognitive reasoning biases may lead to the development of psychotic 
symptoms through higher levels of paranoia, specifically persecutory thoughts, in non-clinical 
populations.  
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In particular, a specific form of anxiety, social anxiety, is predicative of increased 
paranoid ideation (Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008). Both social anxiety and paranoia share the 
experiences ideas of reference (e.g., others are watching and judging you negatively or noticing 
certain aspects about you).  Moreover, cognitive models of social anxiety suggest that socially 
anxious individuals interpret ambiguous information as threatening and this process maintains 
anxiety (Beard & Amir, 2009; Clark & Wells, 1995), analogous to the process that is believed to 
maintain paranoid ideation in schizophrenia (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith, et al., 2005). 
Likewise, similar to social anxiety, increases in self-consciousness lead to greater amounts of 
paranoid ideation. Self-consciousness is the tendency to direct attention inward and the 
awareness that the self as a social object, is a predictor of both social anxiety and paranoid 
ideation (Clark & Wells, 1995; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). Yet, how social anxiety and self-
consciousness influences the experience of paranoid ideation is not fully understood, as these 
cognitive models have yet to be confirmed via experimental paradigms. Moreover, there has 
been limited experimental research on causal pathways to paranoid ideation and few studies have 
directly compared the manipulated levels of paranoid ideation in healthy populations that 
experience significant levels of stress (e.g., undergraduate populations) to that of individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
Experimental paradigms provide the ability to speculate about potential pathways that 
persecutory ideation can develop. There has been limited experimental research on causal 
pathways to persecutory ideation. Many investigators have capitalized on the knowledge that 
anxiety and stress is associated with increases in paranoid thoughts. For example, investigators 
have manipulated stress through loud noises and found increases in paranoid thoughts in people 
with schizophrenia (Moritz et al., 2010). Freeman’s group has used a neutral virtual reality 
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environment where one can interact with avatars to study predictors of paranoid thoughts and 
persecutory ideation. They found that anxiety, depression and worry were associated with 
paranoid interpretations (Freeman et al., 2008). Fenigstein & Vanable (1992) found that sitting in 
front of a one-way mirror can lead to increases in paranoid thoughts in healthy individuals even 
when no mention of the mirror is made. Few studies have compared the manipulated levels of 
paranoid ideation in healthy populations to that of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.  By 
making this comparison, we are better able to understand the continuum of paranoid thoughts 
and the process by which persecutory delusions develop in clinical populations. In sum, this 
study uses previous knowledge gained from past experiments to develop a short, easy fearful 
manipulation designed to increase paranoid ideation in healthy individuals and to determine how 
these levels of paranoid ideation compare to individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.    
To study the mechanisms that contribute to increases in paranoid ideation it is 
advantageous to look at the undergraduate populations.  This time is characterized by frequent 
social encounters and stressful life transitions that may be a significant source of variance that 
contributes to adult psychopathology (Schulenberg, Sameroff, & Cicchertti, 2004).  Specifically, 
community samples suggest that youth may be associated with increased paranoid thoughts (Van 
Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000).  Targeting this population, who is already at risk for 
increases in paranoid thoughts, for experimental manipulation provides us the ability to better 
characterize the contributing factors to paranoid ideation and more problematic persecutory 
ideation.  
In sum, the goal of this study is to establish mechanisms that contribute to increases in 
paranoid ideation.  Experimental paradigms that can induce paranoid ideation provide the ability 
to learn more about the pathways for the development of persecutory ideation in patients without 
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the confounds of medication and cognitive impairment.   Therefore, this study will examine 
whether an experimental fearful emotion induction can increase ideas of reference and 
persecutory ideation. It will also determine how two individual factors (social anxiety and 
cognitive biases) moderate this relationship. 
This study set out to establish anxiety as a mechanism that contributes to paranoid 
ideation such that following a fearful emotion inducing non-clinical populations respond in a 
“psychotic” fashion by reporting similar amounts of persecutory ideation compared to people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Lastly, it is expected that the fear-induced state will interact with 
social anxiety symptoms and reasoning biases to predict the development of self-referential 
ideation and persecutory thoughts. First, undergraduates high in social anxiety will report greater 
amounts of ideas of reference compared to undergraduates low in social anxiety symptoms at 
baseline.  Secondly, at baseline undergraduates high in cognitive reasoning biases will report 
greater amounts of persecutory ideation compared to undergraduates low in cognitive reasoning 
biases.  Following the fearful emotion manipulation, individuals high in cognitive reasoning 
biases or social anxiety will report similar amounts of persecutory ideation compared to a group 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
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Chapter 2. 
Methods 
Participants and procedures 
Undergraduate Participants. The present study recruited college students from the 
University of Michigan Introductory Psychology Subject Pool who participated for course 
research credit and provided informed consent. .  Participants (n=253) were randomly assigned 
to read a neutral story or a fearful story (Appendix 1 & 2) and were instructed to, “…experience 
the event as vividly as possible. Imagine what type of room you are in, the smell of it, what type 
of day it is, the sounds around you, and how you are feeling in reaction to each event-really try to 
experience the event as if it were happening to you.” To further increase feelings of paranoia and 
self-consciousness, students sat in a darkened room facing a one-way mirror while reading the 
story (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). After five minutes, participants were instructed to complete 
an in the moment self-report survey of paranoid thoughts.  Following completion of the survey, 
participants participated in a separate study lasting 20 minutes in duration, the findings of which 
are not reported. This was followed by a debriefing to extinguish any residual effects of the 
mood induction. Participants then completed additional surveys to establish baseline levels of 
paranoia, social anxiety, and cognitive biases. Based on previous literature, it was expected that 
the effect of the emotion manipulation would wear off prior to questionnaire completion since 
past evidence suggests that emotion inductions are short lived, between 10-15 minutes, which 
would be prior to the completion of these surveys. Thus, even though our baseline measures 
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were collected at the end of the experiment, it is unlikely that the induction influenced the 
responses. Six participants were excluded for incomplete or missing data on paranoid ideation. 
The study protocol was approved by the University of Michigan IRB.  
Emotion Manipulation (undergraduate participants only). Two stories were created 
to elicit two emotional states.  The neutral story was adapted from previously published work 
(Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006). (See appendix 1). The 
paranoid condition (fearful) story was developed by a study collaborator for separate emotion 
induction study. (See appendix 2).  The story was adapted for this project to include ambiguous 
social evaluation from a stranger and ambiguous intent of harm with someone following the 
character down a dark street. SCZ participants did not complete the emotion manipulation.  
Participants with Schizophrenia. Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder (SCZ) were part of two previous studies at the University of Michigan 
Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry. Data from these participants (SCZ; n=46) was 
included as a comparison group. A DSM-IV diagnoses of schizophrenia or schizoaffective 
disorder was established using the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997) conducted by graduates students under the supervision of 
doctoral level clinical psychologists.  Participants with SCZ were between the ages of 18-65 and 
were excluded if they met criteria for current DSM-IV Axis I substance abuse or dependence. 
The participants in the schizophrenia group, participated in studies examining clinical and 
cognitive variables. The data was collected under different circumstances than the undergraduate 
sample. In addition to the measures included in this study they completed other self-report 
measures, computer tasks and clinical interviews not included in these analyses. The 
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schizophrenia participants also did not complete the emotion manipulation task that the 
undergraduate participants completed. Participant characteristics are reported in Table 1. 
Assessments 
Demographics. Age and gender information were obtained from both groups.  Due to an 
error in data collection, age data was missing from forty-seven undergraduate participants.  
Completed by SCZ and Undergraduate Participants 
Paranoid Ideation. All participants completed the Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale to 
assess baseline levels of paranoia over the past month (GPTS-B; Green et al., 2008). This 
measure includes two 16-item subscales that will be the focus for the current study; ideas of 
reference (GPTSREF) and persecution (GPTSPERS) and higher scores indicating greater amounts 
of paranoid thoughts.  Each item (e.g., ‘I was stressed out by people watching me’) is rated on a 
5-point Likert-style scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (totally). The scale shows good internal 
consistency in clinical and non-clinical populations, and is sensitive to clinical change. GPTS 
correlates with other measures of positive symptoms in individuals diagnosed with psychotic 
disorders (Green et al., 2008). In a study designed to determine psychometric properties of the 
GPTS, non-clinical participants mean total for 353 non-clinical participants was 22.1 (range 16-
77, S.D. = 9.2) for the persecution subscale and 26.8 (range 16-72, S.D. = 10.4) for the reference 
subscale.  In the validation study by Green and colleagues, the mean age of the non-clinical 
sample was 26.1 (S.D. = 8.9). Clinical participants (N = 50) with current persecutory delusions 
(those that rated mild to severe on the Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms; SAPS; 
Andreasen, 1984) had a mean GPTS score of 55.4 (range 24-80, S.D. = 15.7) for the persecution 
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subscale and 46.4 (range 16-80, S.D. = 16.4) for social reference (Green et al., 2008). The mean 
age of the clinical sample was 43.2 (S.D. = 12.4). 
State Anxiety. The state subscale of the State- Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form X-1; 
STAI-S; Spielberger, 1983) was used to compare levels of state anxiety between the fearful and 
neutral condition in the undergraduate sample. Participants rated their anxiety on a Likert-style 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so).  This scale has been used in clinical and non-clinical 
populations and is well correlated with other measures of negative affect (Nitschke, Heller, Imig, 
McDonald, & Miller, 2001). 
Completed by Undergraduate Participants  
Emotion manipulation measures. Following the mood induction, the Green Paranoid 
Thoughts Scale (post-induction GPTS; Green et al., 2008) was modified with the instructions to 
rate how the participant, “feels in the moment in response to the story,” instead of “feelings you 
may have had about others over the last month.”  This was compared to their level of paranoia 
experienced over the last month. This story was adapted from a previous emotion induction used 
in Vickers, Carpenter & Ellsworth (in prep).  
Social anxiety. Social anxiety was assessed using a short 3-item screening tool for 
generalized social anxiety disorder developed from the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor 
et al., 2001). The Mini-SPIN utilizes the same Likert scale as the SPIN, ranging from 0, (not at 
all) to 4 (extremely), with a maximum total score of 12. It has been used in clinical, non-clinical 
and undergraduate populations. The three items are those questions that exhibit the greatest 
ability to differentiate individuals with generalized social anxiety and control participants and 
has been used in a variety of samples, including undergraduates. The items included are: “Fear of 
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embarrassment causes me to avoid doing things or speaking to people,” “I avoid activities in 
which I am the center of attention, and “Being embarrassed or looking stupid are among my 
worst fears.”  A cut-off of 6 was used in this study to psychometrically identify participants who 
were high vs. low on social anxiety. This cut-off has demonstrated a sensitivity of 88.7% and a 
specificity of 90%, and a diagnostic efficiency of 89.9% in a group of individuals with 
generalized SA and HC (Connor, Kobak, Churchill, Katzelnick, & Davidson, 2001).  
Cognitive Reasoning Biases. Cognitive biases that are considered to be important in the 
development and maintenance of psychosis were assessed using a recently developed 
questionnaire, the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQ-P; Peters et al., 2013).  
The CBQ-P consists of 30 psychosis-relevant vignettes describing everyday events. For each 
item, participants were asked to choose one of three statements that, ‘best describes how you 
might think about the situation.’ The directions explained that there were no right or wrong 
answers and participants should pick their immediate reaction. Vignettes were designed to 
measure 2 separate themes, ‘anomalous experiences’ and ‘threatening events,’ and 5 different 
cognitive biases, intentionalizing, catastrophizing, jumping-to-conclusions, emotional reasoning, 
and dichotomous thinking, considered. A total score is used to determine the level of general 
cognitive biases and the scale has shown good internal consistency and test-retest reliability in 
people diagnosed with a psychotic or depressive disorder and also non-clinical comparison 
groups.  Taken together, the authors suggest that the scale taps into general biases of 
interpretation rather than specific thinking errors (Peters et al., 2013).  
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Chapter 3 
Analysis 
Data from 248 undergraduates and 46 SCZ were analyzed for group characteristics, 
demographics, trait anxiety, social anxiety status, and cognitive biases status within the 
undergraduate groups by condition. All analyses were completed using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.0.   
Experimental manipulation analyses. First, for the neutral and fearful condition groups, 
differences in post-induction GPTS total and subscales (ideas of reference and persecutory 
ideation) were determined with a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with time (post-
induction induction rating, baseline rating) as the within-subjects factor and emotional condition 
(neutral, fearful) as the between-subjects factor. If significant, post-hoc ANOVAs or simple 
effect analyses were conducted. Second, differences in baseline GPTS total and subscales 
between the neutral group, fearful group, and SCZ were determined with one-way ANOVA. 
Third, we compared the post-induction GPTS total and subscales of the neutral and fearful 
groups with SCZ using one-way ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD for post-hoc analysis. 
Social Anxiety. The undergraduate sample was split into high social anxiety (high SA) 
and low social anxiety (low SA) groups based on published Mini-SPIN scores (> 6 = high SA, < 
6 = low SA). Differences in baseline and post-induction GPTS between the groups (up to five 
with neutral low and high SA, paranoid low and high SA, and SCZ) were determined with one-
way ANOVAs and Tukey’s HSD for post-hoc analysis. 
13 
 
Reasoning Biases. The undergraduate sample was split into high cognitive biases (high 
CB) and low cognitive biases (low CB) group based on responses on the CBQp.  Individuals 
who scored above the median 42.0 (M = 43.2, range 32 to 64, S.D. = 5.5) were categorized in the 
low CB group and those above the median were in high CB group. Differences in baseline and 
post-induction GPTS between the three groups (up to five with neutral low and high CB, 
paranoid low and high CB, and SCZ) were determined with one-way ANOVAs and Tukey’s 
HSD for post-hoc analysis. 
All analyses were completed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 23.0. An alpha below 0.05 was considered significant. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Demographic information, depression, general state anxiety, social anxiety, cognitive 
biases and group differences by condition (fearful, neutral, schizophrenia) are displayed in Table 
1.  A significant difference in age between the groups (undergraduates and SCZ) were observed. 
However, there were no significant group differences for STAI-S (Table 1).  
15 
 
Table 1. Demographics, participant means (standard deviations) and group comparisons on all measures. 
  
  Undergraduate Sample  Clinical Sample 
Participant  
Details & Scales 
 Neutral 
(n = 131) 
Fearful  
(n = 121) 
2/t 
(healthy groups) 
 SCZ  
(n = 46) 
2/F 
(all groups) 
Age  19.1 (1.2) 19.2 (1.3) 0.49  41.2 (12.7) 317.41*** 
Sex  65 M, 66 F 58 M, 63 F 0.07  29 M, 17 F 3.23 
STAI-S  39.5 (9.9) 41.5 (10.4) 1.56  38.8 (12.4) 1.59 
M
on
th
ly
 
R
at
in
gs
 GPTSTOTAL  48.9 (17.1)a 52.0 (17.6)a 1.46  64.7 (30.4)b 10.79*** 
GPTSREF  27.3 (10.0)a 29.5 (11.0)a,b 1.67  32.5 (15.3)b 3.78* 
GPTSPERS  21.5 (8.6)a 22.5 (8.1)a 0.94  32.2 (16.5)b 20.16*** 
M
I -
Ra
tin
gs
 GPTSTOTAL  50.7 (17.0)a 67.1 (21.2)b 6.94***  64.7 (30.4)b 20.51*** 
GPTSREF  30.0 (10.8)a 38.3 (11.8)b 6.68***  32.5 (15.3)a 19.04*** 
GPTSPERS  21.7 (7.8)a 28.9 (11.2)b 5.99***  32.2 (16.5)b 21.52*** 
Mini-SPIN  6.3 (3.0) 6.0 (3.3) -0.65  --  
CBQpTOTAL  43.2 (6.1) 43.1 (4.9) -0.16  --  
Note. STAI-S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory-S. GPTSTOTAL = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale-Past Month Total Score. 
GPTSREF = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale- Past Month Ideas of Reference Subscale. GPTSPERS = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale- 
Past Month Persecutory Ideation Subscale. Mini-SPIN = Mini Social Inventory. CBQpTOTAL = Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for 
Psychosis Total Score. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Groups within rows that have different superscripts are significantly 
different at a Tukey correction threshold of p < .05.
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Effect of Emotional Fear Manipulation.  
The mixed-ANOVA showed that the interaction of time (post-induction induction rating, 
baseline rating) the emotional condition (fearful, neutral) reported significantly different amounts 
of GPTS ideas of reference, F(1,250) = 49.51, p > .001, and GPTS persecutory ideation, 
F(1,250) = 43.91, p > .001.  The neutral emotion induction group reported significantly elevated 
post-induction GPTS ideas of reference (M= 1.67, SD = 7.06; t(130) = 2.71, p = .008 CI [.45, 
2.90]), but did not report elevated post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation (M = .14, SD = 
5.46; t(130) = .292, p = .77 CI [.84, 1.08]) compared with baseline GPTS ideas of reference and 
persecutory ideation.  The fearful emotion induction reported both significantly elevated post-
induction GPTS ideas of reference (M = 8.92, SD = 9.23; t(120) = 10.63, p < .001 CI [7.26, 
10.58]) and post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation (M = 6.41, SD = 9.22; t(120) = 7.65, p < 
.001, [CI 4.75, 8.07] compared with the post-induction GPTS ideas of reference and persecutory 
ideation for the neutral emotion induction group. 
Baseline GPTS differences between fearful, neutral and SCZ groups. One-way 
ANOVA showed that the fearful, neutral, and SCZ groups reported significantly different levels 
of baseline GPTS ideas of reference, F(2,295) = 3.78, p = .02, and baseline GPTS persecutory 
ideation, F(2,295) = 20.16, p < .001. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc analysis showed that the SCZ group 
reported significantly higher levels of baseline GPTS persecutory ideation than both the fear-
induced group, p < .001, CI [5.57, 13.71], and the neutral group, p < .001, CI [6.56, 14.65]. The 
SCZ group also reported significantly elevated baseline GPTS ideas of reference compared with 
the neutral group, p = .02, CI [.618, 9.77], only. The fear-induced and neutral groups reported 
similar levels of baseline GPTS ideas of reference, p = .27, CI [1.16, 5.57] and baseline GPTS 
persecutory ideation, p = .72, CI [1.99, 3.97]. Taken together, these data suggest that the two 
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emotion induced groups did not differ in GPTS at baseline, but had lower levels of baseline 
GPTS persecutory ideation and ideas of reference than SCZ. 
Post-induction GPTS differences between fearful, neutral, and SCZ groups. One-
way ANOVA tests showed that the fearful, neutral, and SCZ groups reported significantly 
different GPTS ideas of reference, F(2,296) = 19.04, p < .001, and GPTS persecutory ideation, 
F(2,295) = 20.16, p < .001 (post-induction GPTS for fearful and neutral groups compared with 
baseline GPTS for SCZ). Tukey’s HSD post-hoc analyses showed that participants in the fearful 
group reported both significantly increased post-induction GPTS ideas of reference, p < .001, CI 
[5.73, 12.83], and post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation, p < .001, CI [3.93, 10.42], 
compared with the neutral condition.  Participants in the neutral condition reported significantly 
less post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation than SCZ baseline GPTS persecutory ideation, p 
< .001, CI [-14.89, -6.05]. The fearful group reported similar amounts of post-induction GPTS 
persecutory ideation compared with SCZ baseline GPTS persecutory ideation, p =.19, CI [-7.76, 
1.17], but significantly higher levels of post-induction GPTS ideas of reference than SCZ 
baseline GPTS ideas of reference, p = .02, CI [0.87, 10.65] (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. One-way ANOVA Results for Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale Subscales- Ideas of 
Reference and Persecutory ideation by condition in the undergraduate sample compared to 
the schizophrenia sample’s monthly ratings. Reported are means of each group and bars 
represent standard error. Left panel: Monthly GPTS ratings for each subscale in fearful, 
neutral and schizophrenia groups. Right panel: Post- Emotional Manipulation ratings for 
each subscale. 
 
 
Effect of Emotional Manipulation and Social Anxiety. 
 Baseline GPTS differences between high SA, low SA, and SCZ groups. One-way 
ANOVA showed that undergraduates high and low on SA and stratified by condition reported 
significantly different levels of baseline GPTS ideas of reference, F(4,292) = 4.76, p < .001, and 
baseline GPTS persecutory ideation, F(4,292) = 10.57, p < .001. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc analysis 
showed that baseline GPTS ideas of reference and persecutory ideation was not significantly 
different between the high and low SA groups stratified by fearful or neutral manipulation (ps > 
.46 for all). Both high SA groups, regardless of condition, and SCZ reported similar levels of 
baseline GPTS ideas of reference, ps > .40. However, all SA groups reported significantly less 
baseline GPTS persecutory ideation compared with SCZ, p < .001 (Table 2). 
 Post-induction GPTS differences between high SA, low SA, and SCZ groups. One-
way ANOVA tests showed that groups high and low on SA and stratified by condition reported 
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significantly different levels of post-induction GPTS ideas of reference, F(4,292) = 13.58, p < 
.001, and post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation, F(4,292) = 12.37 p < .001.  Tukey’s HSD 
post-hoc analysis showed that both the low and high SA participants who completed the fearful 
induction reported significantly increased post-induction GPTS ideas of reference and 
persecutory ideation compared with the neutral condition (ps < .026).  In the neutral condition, 
low SA, reported significantly lower post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation than SCZ 
baseline GPTS persecutory ideation (p = .07, CI [-0.33, 12.78]), but not post-induction GPTS 
ideas of reference (p = .07, CI [-0.33, 12.78]) compared with SCZ baseline GPTS ideas of 
reference.  The high SA group, regardless of condition, reported similar levels of post-induction 
GPTS ideas of reference compared with SCZ baseline GPTS ideas of reference (p = .92, CI [-
4.17, 7.79]) and significantly lower post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation compared with 
SCZ baseline GPTS persecutory ideation (p < .001, CI [4.35, 15.40]). However, in the fear-
induced condition, post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation scores were comparable to SCZ for 
both, high SA: p = .892, CI [-3.77, 7.54]; and low SA: p = .154, CI [-1.02, 11.09]. Post-induction 
GPTS ideas of reference in the fear-induced condition of low SA was similar to SCZ baseline 
GPTS ideas of reference, p =.89, CI [-8.77, 4.34], but significantly higher in the SA group, p < 
.001, CI [-14.762, -2.52] (Figure 2) 
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Table 2. Participant Means (standard deviations) and all group comparisons on all measures. The undergraduate sample split 
by low social anxiety (low SA; < 6) and high social anxiety (High SA; ≥6 on the Mini-SPIN). 
 
  Undergraduate Sample      
 Low SA   High SA  SCZ   
Scales  
Mean (SD)  
Neutral 
(n = 51) 
Fearful 
(n = 51)  
Neutral 
(n = 79) 
Fearful 
(n = 70)  (n = 46) 
 F 
(all groups) 
STAI-S  38.0 (8.9)a 37.6 (9.6)a  40.6 (10.3)a,b 44.2 (10.1)b  38.8 (12.4)a  4.397** 
M
on
th
ly
 
R
at
in
gs
 GPTSTOTAL  45.6 (17.8)a 47.7 (15.8)a  50.1 (16.5)a,b 55.2 (18.3)b,c  64.7 (30.4)c  7.13*** 
GPTSREF  24.9 (9.7)a 26.3 (9.4)a  28.8 (10.0)b 31.9 (11.5)b  32.5 (15.3)b  4.76** 
GPTSPERS  20.6 (9.0)a 21.4 (7.1)a  22.0 (8.3)a 23.3 (8.7)a  32.2 (16.5)b  10.57*** 
M
I -
R
at
in
gs
 GPTSTOTAL  46.6 (16.6)a 61.8 (19.0) b,c  53.0 (16.7) a,b 71.4 (21.8)c  64.7 (30.4)c  13.31*** 
GPTSREF  26.3 (10.5)a 37.7 (10.9)b  30.7 (10.7)a,b 41.1 (11.7)c  32.5 (15.3)a,b  13.58*** 
GPTSPERS  20.3 (7.3)a 27.1 (9.8)b,c  22.3 (7.7)a,c 30.3 (12.1)b  32.2 (16.5)b  12.37*** 
Mini-SPIN  3.3 (1.5)a 2.8 (1.6)a  8.3 (1.7)b 8.5 (1.7)b  --  223.10** 
CBQpTOTAL  42.0 (7.0)a 41.7 (4.0)a  44.0 (5.3)a 44.1 (5.3)a  --  3.38* 
Note. STAI-S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory-S. GPTSTOTAL = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale-Past Month Total Score. 
GPTSREF = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale- Past Month Ideas of Reference Subscale. GPTSPERS = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale- 
Past Month Persecutory Ideation Subscale. Mini-SPIN = Mini Social Inventory. CBQpTOTAL = Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for 
Psychosis Total Score. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Groups within rows that have different superscripts those groups are 
significantly different at a Tukey correction threshold of p < .05. 
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Figure 2. Post- Emotional Manipulation one-way ANOVA Results for each Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale Subscale- Ideas of 
Reference and Persecutory ideation by condition, with the undergraduate sample split by high social anxiety (SA; ≥6 on the 
Mini-SPIN) and low social anxiety (HC; < 6 ), compared to the schizophrenia sample’s monthly ratings for each subscale. 
Reported are means of each group and bars represent standard error. The significant group differences are reported in Table 
2. Right panel: Ideas of reference scores for each subscale condition (neutral, fearful) and the monthly schizophrenia scores. 
Left panel: Persecutory ideation scores for each subscale condition (neutral, fearful) and the monthly schizophrenia scores. 
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Effect of Fear Manipulation and Cognitive Biases. 
Baseline GPTS differences between high CB, low CB, and SCZ groups. One-way 
ANOVA showed that groups high and low in CB and stratified by condition reported 
significantly different levels of baseline GPTS ideas of reference, F(4,293) = 8.36, p < .001, and 
baseline GPTS persecutory ideation, F(4,293) = 15.60, p < .001.  However, Tukey’s HSD post-
hoc analysis showed that there were no significant baseline GPTS differences (ideas of reference 
and persecutory ideation) between the CB groups stratified by fearful or neutral condition (ps > 
.50). Both the high CB fearful and neutral groups reported significantly higher baseline GPTS 
persecutory ideation scores than the low CB fearful and neutral groups, ps < .04.  The high CB 
fearful and neutral groups reported similar levels of baseline GPTS ideas of reference compared 
with SCZ, fearful: p = .002, CI [1.13, 10.50]; neutral: p = .001, CI [2.22, 12.69]. The low CB 
neutral group reported significantly less baseline GPTS ideas of reference compared with SCZ (p 
< .001, CI [3.22, 14.55]). The low CB fearful condition did not report significantly different 
baseline GPTS ideas of reference compared with SCZ, p = .07, CI [9.58, .18]. SCZ reported 
significantly higher baseline GPTS persecutory ideation compared with all other groups, ps < 
.002 (Table 3). 
 Post-induction GPTS differences between high CB, low CB, and SCZ groups. One-
way ANOVAs showed that groups high and low in CB and stratified by condition reported 
significantly different levels of both post-induction GPTS ideas of reference, F(4,293) = 13.610, 
p < .001, and post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation, F(4,293) = 14.24, p < .001. Tukey’s 
HSD post-hoc analysis showed that both the low CB and high CB groups in the fearful condition 
reported significantly increased post-induction GPTS ideas of reference and persecutory ideation 
relative to the neutral condition (ps < .01). Within the neutral condition, the low CB group 
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reported significantly less post-induction GPTS ideas of reference compared with SCZ baseline 
GPTS ideas of reference, p = .022, CI [.65, 12.8], while the high CB group reported similar 
levels of post-induction GPTS ideas of reference to SCZ baseline GPTS ideas of reference, p = 
1.0, CI [6.60, 6.02]. Both groups (low CB, high CB) in the neutral condition reported 
significantly less post-induction GPTS persecutory ideation than SCZ baseline GPTS 
persecutory ideation, ps > 002.  Within the fear-induced condition, both the low and high CB 
groups reported similar levels of post-induction GPTS ideas of reference, ps > .30. However, 
only the high CB group in the fear-induced condition reported post-induction GPTS persecutory 
ideation comparable to SCZ, p = 1.0, CI [5.36, 6.19] (Figure 3).
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Table 3. Participant Means (standard deviations) and all group comparisons on all measures. The undergraduate sample split 
by low cognitive biases (Low CB) and high cognitive biases (high CB) using the sample median.  
 
  Undergraduate Sample     
 Low CB   High CB  SCZ  
Scales  
Mean (SD) 
 Neutral 
(n = 71) 
Fearful 
(n =60) 
 Neutral 
(n = 60) 
Fearful 
(n = 61) 
 
(n = 46) 
F 
 
STAI-S  37.8 (9.2)a 39.2 (8.9)a  41.5 (10.3)a,b 43.8 (11.3)b  38.8 (12.4)a,b 3.33* 
M
on
th
ly
 
Ra
tin
gs
 GPTSTOTAL  42.5 (12.4)a 46.8 (14.6)a  56.4 (18.9)b 57.2 (18.9)b  64.7 (30.4)b 12.37*** 
GPTSREF  23.6 (8.0)a 26.8 (9.8)a  31.7 (10.3)b 32.2 (11.4)b  32.5 (15.3)b 8.37*** 
GPTSPERS  18.9 (5.5)a 20.0 (6.1)a  24.7 (10.3)b 25.0 (9.1)b  32.2 (16.5)c 15.60*** 
M
I -
Ra
tin
gs
 GPTSTOTAL  45.8 (14.9)a 63.2 (19.6)b,c  56.5 (17.7)b 71.5 (21.9)c  64.7 (30.4)b,c 14.24*** 
GPTSREF  25.8 (9.2)a 37.1 (11.0)b,c  32.8 (11.3)b 39.8 (12.4)c  32.5 (15.3)b 13.61*** 
GPTSPERS  20.0 (6.7)a 26.1 (10.5)b  23.7 (8.7)a,b 31.7 (11.3)c  32.2 (16.5)c 14.30*** 
MI- Empathy  32.5 (7.2)a 34.0 (7.0)b  33.0 (6.0)a,b 36.7 (6.0)c  -- 5.07** 
Mini-SPIN  5.7 (2.8)a,c 5.3 (3.2)a  7.2 (3.0)b 6.9 (3.1)b,c  -- 5.80** 
CBQpTOTAL  39.0 (2.7)a 39.2 (2.1)a  48.3 (5.0)b 46.9 (3.8)b  -- 124.45*** 
Note. STAI-S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory-S. GPTSTOTAL = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale-Past Month Total Score. 
GPTSREF = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale- Past Month Ideas of Reference Subscale. GPTSPERS = Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale- 
Past Month Persecutory Ideation Subscale. Mini-SPIN = Mini Social Inventory. CBQpTOTAL = Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for 
Psychosis Total Score. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Groups within rows that have different superscripts those groups are 
significantly different at a Tukey correction threshold of p < .05. 
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Figure 3. Post- Emotional Manipulation one-way ANOVA Results for each Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale Subscale- Ideas of 
Reference and Persecutory ideation by condition, with the undergraduate sample split by low cognitive biases and high 
cognitive biases using the sample median, compared to the schizophrenia sample’s monthly ratings for each subscale. 
Reported are means of each group and bars represent standard error. The significant group differences are reported in Table 
3. Left panel: Ideas of reference scores for each subscale condition (neutral, fearful) and the monthly schizophrenia scores. 
Right panel: Persecutory ideation scores for each subscale condition (neutral, fearful) and the monthly schizophrenia scores. 
 
 
  
26 
 
Chapter 5 
Discussion 
  The goal of this study was to shed light on causal mechanisms that contribute to increases 
in paranoid ideation. This study provides clear evidence that ideas of reference and persecutory 
thoughts are not confined to individuals diagnosed with psychotic disorders and can be 
experimentally enhanced in an undergraduate population utilizing a fear mood induction.  
Specifically, undergraduates who completed a fearful mood induction reported 
heightened levels of persecutory thoughts that were comparable to people with schizophrenia, 
along with higher levels of self-referential ideas than people with schizophrenia. Further, both 
social anxiety and cognitive reasoning biases were related to enhanced self-referential and 
persecutory ideation, suggesting that both are contributing mechanisms to paranoid in addition to 
fear.  Since there are only a few studies that compare manipulated levels of paranoid ideation to 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, this study makes a significant contribution to the 
understanding of the etiology of paranoid ideation. The contributions that fear, social anxiety and 
cognitive reasoning biases may make to development in paranoid thoughts are further discussed 
below.   
The Contributing Role of Fearful Emotion Induction  
The present study provides experimental evidence that levels of both persecutory ideation 
and self-referential thinking can be manipulated in undergraduate populations.  While, previous 
efforts to manipulate paranoid ideation have yielded varied results 
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(Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Slater, et al., 2005; Green et al., 2011).  We believe the 
past null results were likely due to the fact that paranoia was treated as unidimensional construct 
and emotion was not included as a factor in their manipulation, where loud noises or a one-way 
mirror alone was used to manipulate paranoia (Keefe & Warman, 2011; Moritz et al., 2010). In 
the current study, not only were robust emotion manipulation methods used, but multiple facets 
of the fear-inducing narrative may have also contributed to heightened paranoid ideation, such as 
the inclusion of strange people and places, strange behaviors that can be interpreted 
ambiguously, and social and physical threats. Thus, the current findings suggest that fear most 
likely plays a causal role in the momentary experience of persecutory thoughts.    
 The Contributing Role of Social Anxiety 
Social anxiety group differences.  In comparison to the schizophrenia sample, 
undergraduates with heightened levels of social anxiety (Mini-SPIN score > 6; Connor et al., 
2001) reported similar levels of baseline self-referential ideation and lower baseline levels of 
persecutory ideation. This finding supports Freeman’s (2008) threat-anticipation model in which 
the experience of ideas of reference are shared by both social anxiety and schizophrenia (e.g., 
fear of negative evaluation by others), but persecutory ideation is limited to schizophrenia. Thus, 
these data suggest that heightened levels of persecutory ideation distinguish people with 
psychosis from socially anxious samples. 
Effects of fear induction on social anxiety. In-line with cognitive models of social 
anxiety, which purport that negative emotions along with ideas of reference and self-
consciousness perpetuate social anxiety, participants in the high SA group likely interpreted the 
fearful story and the one-way mirror as more threatening compared with the low SA group 
(Beard & Amir, 2009; Clark & Wells, 1995).  In particular, the one-way mirror likely enhanced 
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ideas of reference and levels of self-consciousness (e.g., someone is evaluating my performance) 
(citation). Moreover, theoretical models of paranoia propose that current negative emotion, 
interpersonal sensitivities, and anxiety share common pathways that are instrumental factors in 
the development of persecutory ideation (e.g., Freeman et al., 2002). For individuals high in 
social anxiety, it is possible that the acute fear and increased self-consciousness elicited by the 
induction led to similar levels of persecutory thoughts and higher levels of self-referential 
ideation compared with the schizophrenia sample. Taken together, when faced with a fearful 
social situation individuals who report greater social anxieties experience similar amounts of 
momentary persecutory ideation compared with people with schizophrenia.  
The Contributing Role of Cognitive Biases 
Baseline cognitive biases group differences.  Cognitive models of paranoid ideation 
suggest that cognitive biases influence the development of persecutory thoughts (e.g., Freeman, 
Pugh, et al., 2008). In the current study, high CB groups in both the fearful and neutral 
conditions reported similar levels of baseline self-referential ideation compared with the 
schizophrenia group. However, all groups were distinguished by persecutory thoughts—the low 
CB reporting the least, the high CB group, and people with schizophrenia reporting the highest 
levels. Thus, a higher level of cognitive biases in general (i.e., JTC, dichotomous thinking, 
emotional reasoning, etc.) in this undergraduate sample may contribute to persecutory ideation 
(Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007; Warman & Martin, 2006).  
 Effects of fear induction on cognitive biases. As expected, cognitive biases likely 
contribute to self-referential and persecutory thoughts, as undergraduates’ who completed the 
fearful induction and reported high levels of cognitive biases also reported levels of persecutory 
ideation equivalent to SCZ. It is possible that cognitive biases were influenced by the ambiguity 
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of the experiment environment. The presence of the one-way mirror may have invoked the 
possibility that someone is watching you, and heightened pre-existing levels of cognitive biases, 
along with the fearful induction, likely contributed to increased levels of self-referential thoughts 
comparable to the schizophrenia group. These data suggest that, self-referential ideation is 
influenced more by the environment, rather than biased reasoning (e.g., Bentall, Kinderman, & 
Kaney, 1994; Freeman, Gittins, et al., 2008). Thus, both acute fear and environmental ambiguity 
likely play a causal role in the momentary experience of persecutory thoughts, which may be 
further enhanced by heightened levels of pre-existing cognitive biases (Freeman et al., 2002). 
 The involvement of cognitive biases in the development of paranoid ideation and 
delusional content is especially relevant to therapeutic interventions. Cognitive behavioral 
therapy challenges biased thoughts and how people evaluate and use evidence to make decisions 
or form beliefs, and emotional reappraisal strategies are typically helpful in reducing paranoid 
thoughts in response to neutral stimuli (Westermann, Kesting, & Lincoln, 2012). New treatment 
methods for psychotic disorders such as cognitive behavioral therapy for psychosis have 
emphasized challenging biased cognitive reasoning and reality testing for delusional content, and 
the current findings provide experimental evidence for these types of treatment (e.g., Beck & 
Rector, 2000; Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007; Turkington, 
Kingdon, & Turner, 2002). 
Limitations 
We had limitations in this study based on our sample characteristics.  First, the 
individuals with schizophrenia and undergraduate samples were not matched on age, as SCZ data 
were collected from previous studies (participant mean age was 41.2) while the average age of 
UM subject pool participants is 19.  This is problematic because the groups’ differences could be 
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due to age. However, our goal in including clinically stable schizophrenics was to have a 
reference point to compare to our manipulated variables and this was not possible to do and 
match with age. Further, what was remarkable was not how they differed, rather how we could 
make them respond similarly, despite differences in their age and clinical status.  In addition, this 
study relied on self-report data and the data from the schizophrenia group was collected under 
fairly different circumstances and at a different time compared to the undergraduate samples. 
Behavioral or clinician rated measures of paranoid ideation, social anxiety and cognitive biases 
would decrease the possibility that findings could be accounted for by method-related factors. 
While subjecting participants diagnosed with schizophrenia to a situation that would increase 
their symptoms, in future studies a neutral analogous testing environment to that experienced by 
the non-clinical group should be utilized. Despite these limitations, the current results contribute 
to the literature by providing evidence in a large sample of participants, acute fear can lead to 
clinical levels of ideas of reference and persecutory thoughts and that these findings are modified 
by levels of social anxiety and cognitive bias.   
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Appendix 1 
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 
 
1.  You wake up and head to the bathroom to brush your teeth. You spend some time getting 
ready and you place the dirty clothes in the laundry hamper before heading downstairs. You 
pull out a bowl from the cupboard and make yourself a bowl of cereal. As you’re finishing up 
your breakfast the phone rings. The dry cleaner is telling you that your things are ready to be 
picked up. After putting your bowl and spoon in the dishwasher you grab your keys, cell 
phone, wallet, and head out to the dry cleaner.  
 
2.  The bus stop is only a couple of blocks away and it will not take you long to get there. As 
you walk away from your porch you remember that you also need to get a package of printer 
paper from the hardware store in order to hang things. You can do that afterward. When you 
reach the bus stop you take a look at the schedule to see when the next one will be coming 
by. It looks like it’ll take about 8 minutes. That won’t be long.  
 
3.  You were just starting to lose track of time when the number 43 bus pulls up. As you deposit 
your money into the machine on the bus you notice that the driver seems very focused on the 
road. Looking down the bus, there aren’t many people—plenty of open seats. You make your 
way down to an open one where the seats are elevated. It is close to the rear door making it a 
quick exit once you reach your destination.  
 
4.  Seven stops later you get to Second Street, where the dry cleaner is. There is a little store to 
down the street that might carry printer paper. Since you don’t want to carry around your dry 
cleaning you head there immediately.  As you enter, a quiet bell rings and a clerk asks if you 
need help finding anything. You tell them you are looking for printer paper and are quickly 
pointed to their location, rung up, and politely thanked. You head back to the dry cleaners’, 
hand them your claim receipt, and your belongings passed over the counter to you. Being 
careful not to wrinkle them, you walk back to the bus stop and prepare to head home. 
 
5.  It seems like the bus pulls up slightly quicker than the one by your house. You head on 
board, take a seat, and gaze out the window, being careful not to wrinkle your freshly dry 
cleaned clothes. Once you get home you unlock the door and place your dry cleaning in the 
closet.  
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Appendix 2 
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 
 
1.  It is Friday afternoon over the summer and you have plans to go to a friend’s house and 
watch movies. The day is beautiful, warm with a cool breeze, so you head off on the 20 
minute walk to their house. Lots of people are out enjoying the day, pushing strollers and 
jogging, and lots of children playing at the park between your houses. As you are walking 
you keep felling like people keep looking at you, but you can’t tell because they are wearing 
sunglass. You check in the mirror to see if something is on your face, but nothing is there. 
Before you know it you’re at your friend’s house. 
 
2.  You knock on the door and your friend greets you. You sit down on the backyard patio for a 
short while, chatting and catching up on what you have done over the week. After a bit, you 
two decide to head inside and start to watch television.  
 
3.  Your friends invited another person over from her math class.  The person keeps looking at 
you awkwardly and you can’t tell if it’s because they’re awkward or they don’t like you. You 
notice them whisper to one of your friends a few times and you can’t tell if they are looking 
at you. Time passes quickly and suddenly it’s already after midnight. You think that perhaps 
it’s a little too late to be walking home alone so you call for a cab. The dispatcher informs 
you that you’ll have to wait at least 45 minutes. Your think about waiting, but you can tell 
your friend is tired and it takes less time to walk home. As you begin walking down the street 
you notice that the streets are not well lit. You feel a little isolated and uncomfortable, but 
you tell yourself that there is nothing to be worried about.  
 
4.  It’s very quiet outside but you feel people’s presence as you walk by all the houses with lit 
windows. You reach the park between your houses when you notice two silhouettes in dark 
sweaters on a bench smoking cigarettes. You initially feel startled but tell yourself that it’s 
nothing to be concerned about and continue walking. As you walk past you notice that they 
stand up. At the end of the block you notice that the people behind you seem to be getting 
closer, with the footsteps steadily approaching from behind. You cross the street to walk on 
the opposite side of the road. You hear soft whispers as one of the men crosses as well.  
 
5.  You try not to think about it and begin walking more quickly. You round the corner and look 
behind you.  You don’t see anyone around, but you can’t shake the feeling that someone is 
behind you.  
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